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Abstract
This paper presents an endogenous growth model with heteroge-
neous labour, endogenous unemployment, and public sector corruption.
Unlike most previous studies, the model does not separate public o¢ -
cials and private individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking
up bureaucratic appointment as a public servant is modelled as an oc-
cupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determination
of the proportion of public o¢ cials, the share of corrupt o¢ cials among
them, and the public investment e¢ ciency of the economy. The dy-
namics of endogenous corruption and unemployment are studied using
numerical policy experiments based on a stylized representation of a
middle-income African economy with high corruption and unemploy-
ment. The main nding is that, large-scale public infrastructure push
has no e¤ect on raising growth in an economy with high corruption.
However, if preceded by social and anti-corruption policies that suc-
cessfully induce a structural change, it will then be e¤ective in raising
growth.
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1 Introduction
In most developing economies, notably lower-middle income economies with
poor institutional and governance quality, public o¢ cials, often well-educated
groups of elites, are in unique positions to abuse their powers in the various
forms of corruption. Public sector corruption, broadly dened as the ille-
gal or unauthorised proteering by public o¢ cials abusing their authoritative
positions, can manifest in di¤erent forms including embezzlement of public
funds, fraud claims, and direct receipts of bribery and o¤ers substantial per-
sonal gains at the costs of society, hence potentially causing signicant damage
to socio- and economic development (Blackburn et al., 2011).
In the literature of public sector corruption, the contributions made in the
form of microeconomic and applied empirical studies over the last decade have
been enormous1, with development economists now having a general consensus
on the long-term adverse impact of corruption on growth and development.
Indeed, corruption activities often transcend direct practicing of fraud and
bribery, especially when there are principal-agent considerations in the duties
of public o¢ cials (Banerjee, 1997; Guriev, 2004; Fredriksson, 2010). As such,
corruption can be persistent over time, hence adversely a¤ecting the levels of
private investment (Mauro, 1997), human capital accumulation (Ehrlich and
Liu, 1999), income certainty (Dzhumashev, 2016), and inequality (Blackburn
and Forgues-Puccio, 2009) over the long run. These are supported by ndings
in the vast empirical literature, where evidence shows that most developing
countries with poor institutions and high levels of corruption have experi-
enced poor growth performance. For instance, Mauro (1997) and Delavallade
1Examples of microeconomic models with public sector rent-seeking and corruption in-
clude, non-exhaustively, Cule and Fulton (2005), Infante and Smirnova (2009), Ryvkin and
Serra (2012), Fredriksson (2014), and relevant references therein. These studies examine
corruption manifesting in di¤erent forms, but not their implications to economic growth in
a general equilibrium, macroeconomic context.
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(2006) document evidence that corruption tends to lead to a diversion of pub-
lic expenditure from growth-promoting productive spending to non-productive
spending. Moreover, the adverse e¤ects of corruption on growth are shown by
Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) and Dzhumashev (2016) to be both nonlinear
and non-monotonic, with the latter two suggesting the possible existence of a
non-zero level of corruption that could be growth-enhancing.
Of the many forms of public sector corruption, public sector rent-seeking
and embezzlement of funds associated with procurement of public infrastruc-
ture projects have been the most popular choice for growth theorists in mod-
elling corruption in theoretical macroeconomic models (for instance, Bose et
al., 2008; Blackburn et al., 2011; Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris, 2011). To
our knowledge, notwithstanding the fact that public procurement accounts for
nearly 70 percent of many central governmentsexpenditure, this is mainly
due to two reasons: (i) asymmetric information associated with procurement
of most large-scale public infrastructure/capital good investments exists and
leads to principal-agent problem, hence creating the opportunities for public
o¢ cials to embezzle funds (Sarte, 2000; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001); (ii)
as motivated in studies such as Delavallade (2006) and Dzhumashev (2014),
the two-way relationship between corruption and government spending tends
to a¤ect the allocation and composition of public spending. With most en-
dogenous growth models having public capital as a key growth driver, the
embezzlements taking place through procurement therefore provides the most
direct means to examine the two-way relationship, as well as their e¤ects on
di¤erent spending allocation.
Despite the many contributions, there remains knowledge gaps in the body
of literature on public sector corruption and growth in developing, middle-
income economies. For instance, despite plenty of anecdotal evidence and of-
ten attract attention from development practitioners and policymakers alike,
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the corruption-unemployment nexus has received little attention from the aca-
demic community. As often argued by the World Bank, and in contributions
such as Ndikumana (2006) and Bakare (2011), both corruption and unemploy-
ment are often two of the most pressing policy issues facing many developing
economies. High level of corruption, notably embezzlement of public funds, has
been a persistent issue in many developing countries.2 These contributed to
low-quality public investment, discouraged private physical and human capital
investment, and consequently results in dampened growth, which in turn per-
petuates unemployment. Sustained unemployment then results in economic
instability and an increase in illegal activities (often in the forms of black
market), which then makes it easier and cheaper for corruption practices. In-
deed, faced with a weakened economy with large gaps in infrastructure, a
lack of skills, and poor public service delivery, the goals of ghting corrup-
tion and tackling unemployment have become the main policy priorities of
many Sub-Saharan African economies.3 Second, given the lack of attention
paid to corruption-unemployment nexus, to our knowledge, almost all macro-
economic of corruption models with public embezzlement do not account for
structural unemployment and skill acquisitions.4 This is despite the World
2In fact, globally, embezzlement of public funds have been one of the persistent form of
public sector corruption. For instance, according to UN Crime Survey statistics, between
the two periods of 1998-99 and 2005-2006, the number of o¢ cially reported embezzlement
cases in the world is 213,477 and 235,758 respectively for the 2 periods. This is despite many
developing economies opted not to respond to the survey. This, couple with the inherent
di¢ culties in actually nding one to be guilty of embezzling public funds (the average
conviction rate of the UN surveyed sample of developing countries during the period is only
about 20 percent), makes embezzlement a persistent form of public sector corruption in the
developing world.
3For instance, upon taking o¢ ce, the current Nigerian President Buharis administration
identied the twin-highproblem corruption and unemployment as main policy priorities,
against the backdrop of continuing poor public service delivery and sluggish growth.
4Indeed, even among empirical contributions, to our knowledge, Lackó (2004) and Bouzid
(2016) are the only studies that examine the nexus between corruption and unemployment
albeit youth unemployment and establish empirically a two-way relationship. Nevertheless,
these empirical exercises are neither anchored by microfoundations nor general equilibrium
framework.
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Bank (2012) suggested an indirect e¤ect of corruption on unemployment: the
reduced public investment quality results in lower growth and income, which
in turn impedes job creation in the long-run. There is therefore a role for
labour market reforms to potentially tackle corruption issues too. E¤ective
labour market reforms are necessary to facilitate human capital development,
improve social cohesion, and this can consequently reduce the incentive for
corruption to preview, these are key features that policy experiments using
the analytical model developed in this article is able to produce.5 Third, given
the lack of attention paid to corruption-unemployment nexus, the present lit-
erature lacks an analytical model that allows for endogenous determination
of variables such as proportion of skilled labour in public sector, and propor-
tion of public o¢ cials that are corrupt (in most models, both are treated as
exogenously given, distinct groups of agents that are treated separately from
the households who consume and save). Fourth, to our knowledge, none of
the (comparatively) large existing analytical literature on corruption focus-
ing on embezzlement has examined transitional dynamics of policies. These
studies therefore cannot make claims with regards to the dynamic trade-o¤s
(long-term versus instantaneous) of policies.
We address these 4 shortcomings in the existing literature by formally de-
veloping a dynamic endogenous growth model with endogenous determination
of unemployment and public sector corruption. In terms of existing studies, the
heterogeneous abilities and endogenous human capital accumulation features
of Spinesi (2009) and Agénor and Lim (2017) are integrated into a model with
public capital procurement, similar to Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011),
to examine the many policy issues cited, including studying the transitional
dynamics of policies.
5The impact of labour market reforms in reducing structural unemployment and raising
growth is well-documented in studies such as Agénor et al. (2007), Bernal-Verdugo et al.
(2012), and Anand and Khera (2016).
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To preview, there are three main novel features in the model. First, in the
process of public procurement, distinctions are made between actual and re-
ported/claimed spending on public capital. This creates a discrepancy between
actual and reported/claimed spending on public capital goods. As public in-
vestment budgetary process is based on the latter, this can result in ine¤ec-
tiveness of public infrastructure investment, a nding similar in spirit to those
empirically documented for health and education spending in poorly governed
countries by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008). Indeed, the public investment
e¢ ciency index, which is usually treated as a parameter in the literature, is
endogenously determined in this model. Second, our policy simulation re-
sults show that, the seemingly (and usually classied as) unproductive social
spending aimed at raising minimal income has a role to play in closing the gap
between actual and reported/claimed spending, therefore raising public invest-
ment e¢ ciency. When such a reform reduces corruption to a large magnitude,
this can then serve as impetus to a structural change and restore the e¤ective-
ness of public infrastructure investment in driving growth. Lastly, unlike most
growth models of corruption, we do not separate public o¢ cials and private
individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appoint-
ment as a public servants is modelled as an occupational choice albeit one
that has specication that ensures complete bureaucratic participation which
then allows for the proportion of public o¢ cials, as well as the share among
those that are corrupt, to be endogenously determined. In my knowledge, this
is among the rst instances where the dynamics of endogenous corruption and
unemployment are examined together in a model of endogenous growth. As
multilateral organisations alike have moved forward with designing more con-
crete measurement of corruption, this allows us to provide a direct theoretical
counterpart where variables such as the share of corrupt o¢ cials and pub-
lic investment e¢ ciency can be directly parameterised and studied as policy
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variables.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 denes the balanced growth equilibrium and discusses
its properties. Model parameterisations are reported in Section 4 to reect
the initial state of a typical middle-income Sub-Saharan African economy fac-
ing high rates of unemployment and corruption, though with some degree of
industrialisation. In Section 5, various policy experiments are analysed and
discussed. Section 6 concludes the article.
2 The Model
Time is discrete with t = 0; 1; :::;1, and the economy is populated by two-
periods lived individuals (adulthood and old age) with di¤erent innate abilities.
Population is constant at N . Each individual is risk neutral and endowed with
one unit of time in each period of life. In old age, time is allocated entirely to
leisure. In the beginning of adulthood, individuals decide whether to acquire
skills or to directly enter into the workforce as unskilled workers. The acqui-
sition of skills is necessary if one were to work as public o¢ cials, or skilled
workers in the private sector (specically, non-routine task in the design sec-
tor). Both the unskilled and skilled workers can be unemployed, of which then
they collect an unemployment benet/cash transfer from an unemployment
insurance fund nanced by rmspayroll contribution and administered by
the government. In addition, the government also operates a general budget,
where expenditure consists primarily of public investment and public emolu-
ments. The latter consists of the wages paid to the public o¢ cials employed
to procure for public capital goods using funds allocated from the former.
Corruption arises from the incentive of an o¢ cial to appropriate public
funds by falsifying information to the government during the public procure-
ment process. This creates a discrepancy between actual and reported/claimed
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spending on public capital goods. As public investment budgetary process is
based on the latter, this can result in ine¤ectiveness of public infrastructure
investment, unless the gap is closed.
Lastly, the private production sectors consist of a nal good sector and a
consolidated intermediate goods and design sector. Unemployment prevails in
the economy due to labour market imperfection associated with union bar-
gaining of wages.
In terms of existing studies, the unemployment and private sector aspects
of the model are most similar to Agénor and Lim (2017), while the public sector
features the corruption due to uncertainty associated with procurement costs"
attributes introduced initially in Bose et al. (2008), and subsequently modied
by Blackburn et al. (2011) and Haque and Kneller (2015).
2.1 Individuals
Individuals have identical preferences but are born with di¤erent abilities, in-
dexed by a. Ability is instantly observable by all and follows a continuous
distribution with density function f(a) and cumulative distribution function
F (a), with support (0; 1). For tractability, a is assumed to be uniformly dis-
tributed on its support. Each individual maximises utility and decides whether
to engage in market work as an unskilled worker or (after spending % to acquire
skills) as a skilled worker. Specically, an adult with ability a can enter the
labour force at the beginning of period t as an unskilled worker and earn the
net wage (1 )wUt , which is independent of the workers ability. Alternatively,
the individual may choose to rst spend a fraction % 2 (0; 1) of his/her time
endowment at the beginning of adulthood in advanced training, incur a cost
tct > 0, and then enter the labour force for the remainder of the period as a
skilled worker, either working in the private sector as a design worker, or in the
public sector as a public o¢ cial. The former earns after-tax wage of (1 )wSt ,
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while the latter earns non-taxable wage, wSt . During training, workers earn
no income. All individuals can either be employed (superscript E) or un-
employed (superscript L). If unemployed, individuals earn an unemployment
benet/cash transfer from the government, bt, which is not taxable.
Let ch;jtjt+n denote consumption at period t+n of an individual h = U; SY; SG,
either employed or unemployed, j = E;L, born at the beginning of period t,
with n = 0; 1. It is assumed that individuals treat his/her consumptions in
both periods as perfect substitutes, with the discounted utility function spec-
ied as:
V h;jt = c
h;j
tjt +
ch;jtjt+1
1 + 
; h = U; SY; SG; j = E;L (1)
where  > 0 is the common discount rate parameter.6
Generally, in the absence of corruption possibility, the period-specic bud-
get constraints are given by
cU;jtjt + s
Uj
t =

(1  )wUt
bt
if j = E
if j = L
; (2)
cS;jtjt + s
S;j
t =
8<:
(1  )[(1  %)wSt   tct]
(1  %)bt   tct
(1  %)wSt   tct
if h = SY; j = E
if j = L
if h = SG; j = E
(3)
ch;jtjt+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
h
t ; h = U; SY; SG; j = E;L (4)
where sh;jt is savings, 1 + rt+1 the gross rate of return between periods t and
t+ 1, and  2 (0; 1) the tax rate.
Note that the budget constraint specied above for a public o¢ cial applies
only to non-corrupt o¢ cials, since at the point when training decision would
6Given that individuals work only in one period and consume during old-age, the issue
of risk aversion has minimal implications on the central issues investigated in this article.
Perfect substitutes is therefore a reasonable utility specication that would vastly simplify
the analytical complications involved in deriving the two threshold conditions later (to train
or not train; to corrupt or not corrupt). Also, as seen later, the use of a log-utility function
is impractical as a corrupt o¢ cial who gets caught would have all the income conscated
and left with a net negative payo¤.
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have to be made, an individual does not factor into the possibility of a cor-
ruption opportunity arisen when he has been employed as a public o¢ cial. As
such, an individual nds it optimal to train if and only if his expected (after-
tax) earnings as a skilled worker, adjusted for the time and pecuniary costs of
training, exceeds the expected earnings of an unskilled worker:
(1 %)(SYt (1 )wSt +SGt wS+SLt bt) tct  (1 ULt )(1 )wUt +ULt bt; (5)
where the going wage, or the unemployment benet, is weighted by the re-
spective probability of being either employed or unemployed, ht 2 (0; 1), for
h = SY; SG; SL; UY; UL.7 In specifying (5), we assume that an individual
knows if his/her ability is above or below the threshold aC and can therefore
decide whether to acquire skills or not at the beginning of adulthood.
In line with Galor and Moav (2000), Tanaka and Iwaisako (2009), and
following the specications of Agénor (2016), Agénor and Canuto (2017), and
Agénor and Lim (2017), the training cost is assumed to be proportional to the
expected skilled wage when employed and varies inversely with the individuals
ability, which determines how fast (or how well) he or she can learn:
tct = (1  %)(SYt (1  )wSt + SGt wSt )=a; (6)
with ;  2 (0; 1).
As shown in the Appendix, the threshold level of ability aCt such that all
individuals with ability higher than aCt choose to undergo training is given by
aCt = 
1=

1  (1  %) 1 (1  
UL
t )(1  )wUt + ULt bt   (1  %)SLt bt
SYt (1  )wSt + SGt wSt
 1=
:
(7)
The productivity of unskilled workers is constant regardless of ability and
is normalised to unity. Given (7), the raw supply of unskilled labour, NUt ,
7Equation (5) is assumed to hold as a strict inequality for the individual with the highest
ability, that is, a = 1, otherwise nobody would choose to become skilled.
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is equal to the number of individuals in the population who choose not to
undergo training:
NUt =
N
Z aCt
0
f(a)da = aCt
N: (8)
The raw supply of skilled workers, at any time t, is N
R 1
aCt
f(a)da = (1  
aCt )
N . However, the average skill level of workers with ability a 2 (aCt ; 1) who
have undergone training equals (aCt + 1)=2; thus, the e¤ective supply of skilled
labour at time t, can be dened as
NSt =
1  (aCt )2
2
N: (9)
2.2 Final Good
The perfectly competitive nal good production sector is characterised by
routine task, populated by a continuum of rm i, i 2 (0; 1), each producing
a homogeneous good, Y it , which requires the use of unskilled labour, N
UY
i;t ,
private capital, KPi;t, a combination of intermediate inputs, xi;s;t, s 2 (0;Mt),
and aggregate public capital, KGt .
The production function is specied as
Y it = [
KPt
N 
](NUYi;t )
U (KPi;t)
[
Z Mt
0
xi;s;tds]
=(KGt )
$; (10)
where U ; ;  2 (0; 1), ! > 0, U +  +  = 1,  2 (0; 1) and 1=(1   ) > 1
is (the absolute value of) the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate
good, and KPt is the aggregate private capital. Constant returns prevail with
respect to private inputs, and production is subject to a standard Arrow-
Romer type of externality associated with the aggregate private capital stock,
though subject to congestion by the total population size at  > 0.
Assuming full depreciation, rm is prots are dened as
Yi;t = Y
i
t  
Z Mt
0
P st xi;s;tds  wUt NUYi;t   rtKPi;t: (11)
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Each rm maximises prots subject to (11) with respect to labour, private
capital, and quantities of intermediate goods xi;s;t, 8s, taking factor prices and
Mt as given. This yields, in standard fashion,
wUt = 
U Yi;t
NUYi;t
; (12)
rt = (
Yi;t
KPi;t
): (13)
xi;s;t = (
Zi;t
P st
)1=(1 ); s = 1; :::Mt; (14)
Zi;t = Yi;t=
Z Mt
0
(xi;s;t)
ds: (15)
2.3 Intermediate Goods and Designs
Given the focus is on a middle-income economy with some degree of industrial-
ization, a Romerian specication is used for the intermediate goods (IG) sector,
where monopolistically competitive market structure is assumed. Nonetheless,
these may be interpreted as imported technology-based imitation activities,
instead of innovation. To produce an IG, a corresponding design has to be
purchased from a counterpart design rm. The design rms are the private
sector employers of skilled labour in this economy. There is only one producer
of each input s, and each of them must pay a fee to use the design. Production
of each unit of an IG uses a single unit of the nal good. Each IG producer
sets a price to maximise prots, given the perceived demand function for its
good. With a standard optimal price of P st =
1

: 8s = 1; :::Mt, the quan-
tity demanded at this price is xs;t = (Zt)1=(1 ), 8s, which under symmetryRMt
0
xs;tds = Mtx

t , yields
xt = (
Yt
Mt
); (16)
with maximum prot of
It = (1  )(
Yt
Mt
): (17)
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Following Agénor and Canuto (2015), IG rms are assumed to last only
one period, and that patents are auctioned o¤ randomly to a new group of
rms in each period. Thus, each producer of a new intermediate good holds a
patent only for the period during which it is bought, implying monopoly prots
during that period only; yet patents last forever. By arbitrage, therefore,
Qt = 
I
t : (18)
Meanwhile, rms engaged in design generate blueprints for new interme-
diate goods, using the same technology. Each rm produces a single design
and there is no aggregate uncertainty. The aggregate stock of designs evolves
according to
Mt+1  Mt = (K
G
t
KPt
)&
m
1 Mt
(1  %)NSYt
N
; (19)
which uses skilled workers, and depends on the public-private capital ratio
(Agénor and Alpaslan, 2014) and the stock of designs (Jones, 2005). To elimi-
nate scale e¤ects, it is the ratio of workers to total population that is specied
in the production function.8
Prot maximisation by the design rms (by selecting NSYt ) involves max-
imising t = Qt(Mt+1  Mt)   [wSt (1   %)NSYt ] subject to the skilled wage,
yields a rst-order condition of
wSt =
Qt(k
G
t )
&m1 Mt
NSYt
; (20)
where kGt = K
G
t =K
P
t . In turn, by substituting in the expression for Qt, the
skilled wage in the private sector is given by
wSt =
[(kGt )
&m1 (1  )]Yt
NSYt
: (21)
8See Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
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2.4 Wages-Setting
To obtain a model equilibrium with non-zero unemployment, we adopt the
straightforward labour market institution of a monopoly union framework.
Following Agénor and Lim (2017), two separate but similar unions exist
one each for the unskilled and skilled workers in the private sector where
the wage-setting process takes place between a centralised trade union and
rms. The unionsobjectives are to maximise the expected current income
of its members, subject to wage and employment targets, taking the existing
capital stock (for unskilled) and design stock (for skilled) as given. The unions
therefore do not internalise the e¤ect of future wages on the rms decision to
accumulate capital and thus future labour demand, e¤ectively making it a
static optimisation problem at every period t.9
Specically, for h = U; S, the union sets wUt or w
S
t with the objective of
maximising a utility function that depends on deviations of both employment
and wages from their target levels, subject to the labour demand schedule
for each type. Normalising the employment target to zero, the unions utility
function takes the standard form
Vht = (w
h
t   whTt )
h
(Nht )
1 h ; (22)
where h = U; S, h 2 (0; 1), and Nht is given in (12). The term whTt measures
the unions target wage, whereas h reects the relative importance that the
union attaches to wage deviations from that target.
Maximising (22) with respect to wht gives the actual wage as a mark-up
9An alternative specication is to consider a Nash wage bargaining process, in which
case then the labour demand is derived from the bargaining process instead of rmsprot
maximisation decision. However, given that the two types of workers work in di¤erent
sectors, and that the di¤erence in bargaining features will not result in signicant di¤erence
to the unemployment-corruption nexus, we use the more convenient monopoly union model
where unions set wage taking labour demand schedule of rms as given. See Bhattacharyya
and Gupta (2015) for a direct comparison of the two specications.
14
(which is increasing in h) over the target wage,
wht = (
1  h
1  2h )w
hT
t : (23)
We specify the target wages to be linearly dependent on the minimum
level of income a worker would otherwise earn if unemployed, bt, adjusted
(negatively) to the unemployment rate of the respective category of workers,
as in
whTt = bt(
h
t )
 {hwh0 ; h = UL; SL (24)
where {UL; {SL > 0, wh0 and 
h
t , h = UL; SL denote shift parameter and the
unemployment rate (in proportion of N) of labour category h, with
bt = t
Yt
N
; (25)
where t > 0 is an endogenously determined (by the governments allocation)
benet/social security indexation ratio variable. Consistent with most spec-
ication, it is also indexed to the level of per capita income in each period
t.10 ;11
Using (23), (24), and (25), we can derive an alternative expression for wUt
and wSt , as in
wUt = t(
1  U
1  2U )w
U
0 (
Yt
N
)(ULt )
 {U ; (26)
and
wSt = t(
1  S
1  2S )w
S
0 (
Yt
N
)(SLt )
 {S ; (27)
respectively.
10Unlike Agénor and Lim (2017), which focuses on examining the impacts of various labour
market policies in developed and upper-middle income economies, the focus of this paper, the
corruption-unemployment nexus, is usually more relevant in a developing economy context
most of which have non-binding minimum wage and unemployment benets. As such, bt in
this context can be interpreted as some form of social security payment or cash transfers to
meet the minimum income of the unemployed.
11In relatively parsimonious partial equilibrium model, such as Heer and Morgenstern
(2005), the unemployment benet is indexed to previous periods earnings. While our
indexation is to the same-period income per capita, t is endogenous here, which then
allows for much richer dynamic feedback from the system into the benet indexation.
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2.5 Public Sector
Based on the public procurement framework of Blackburn et al. (2011) and
Haque and Kneller (2015), the government is specied to hire public o¢ cials
(paying non-taxable market salary, wSt ) to procure capital goods to be used
for public investment. Given the non-taxable nature of wage income for pub-
lic o¢ cials, skilled labour will always prefer to work for the government than
in the private sector. This ensures the allocation of talent condition in Ace-
moglu and Verdier (1998) would hold, as the government can ensure complete
bureaucratic participation just by paying the skilled market wage, wSt . As
shown later, to nance the public o¢ cialssalaries, the government allocates a
constant fraction, G, of the government revenue each period as public emol-
uments.
On aggregate, the government demands gt amount of capital goods, which
is a constant fraction of the nal output in the economy,  Yt (Blackburn
et al. 2010; Blackburn et al. 2011). To ensure model stability, we assume
that the government keeps  constant over time by setting  = KG0 =Y0, in
accordance to the initial public capital-nal output ratio, KG0 =Y0. This means
capital goods demanded in each period t is budgeted according to the initial
ratio, and even as the ratio changes over time, the demand planned by the
government in a specic period remains as a constant share of the output in
said period. As such, there exists a planning gap, where there is a discrepancy
between the aggregate public capital level demanded by the government for
the economy, and the actual supply of the public capital-nal output ratio in
each period t, KGt =Yt.
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Further, and more critical to understand corruption in the model, there
12As would be seen in the policy experiments later, we analyse an additional case where
 t is endogenous and varies over time. In this case, the government is assumed to attempt
to close the planning gap between the aggregate demand and supply of public capital good-
to-nal output ratio by resetting its demand based on the new public capital good-to-nal
output ratio in each period.
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exists a discrepancy between actual spending on public capital goods and
claimed/reported spending. In each period t, each public o¢ cial is responsible
to procure gt=NSGt raw units of capital goods and claim the corresponding
spending o¤ the total governmental allocation to public infrastructure invest-
ment. However, the public capital goods have to be quality-adjusted, as in
Blackburn et al. (2011) and Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011), a process
that requires the public o¢ cials to procure for a quality component. There
are two states of purchases in terms of quality: high-quality or low-quality.
A low-quality purchase yields only  < 1 unit of quality despite costing 1
unit of nal good. A high-quality purchase always yields 1 unit of quality,
though it is subject to higher and uncertain cost, indexed by . Due to this
uncertainty, each o¢ cial faces di¤erent realized cost drawn at random, with 
assumes a uniform distribution with support t 2 (1; max). The government
is aware of the overall distribution of the cost, though it does not observe the
true cost and quality, therefore have to rely on public o¢ cials. As such, po-
tential corruption opportunity arises because an o¢ cial can falsify information
by over-reporting the unit cost. To avoid corner solution, it is also specied
that a corrupt o¢ cial will not be able to claim the maximum amount, max,
because the government knows the upper-bound value, therefore will always
claim his/her respective optimal cost at time t, t.
A public o¢ cial that is not corrupt is always going to maximise public
capital good quality per unit of expenditure. Specically, the o¢ cial procures
gt=N
SG
t units of (quality-adjusted) capital goods (with quality of 1) at the
actual realized cost. On average, the claim made by a public o¢ cial is therefore
 = (1 + max)=2.13 In this instance, a public o¢ cial will then earn (1  %)wSt
(recall that a constant fraction of time, %, has been spent in acquiring skills).
13Note that this does not mean that actual realized cost will be the same. Due to the
cost uncertainty, the actual realized cost for each o¢ cial will be di¤erent, as this is drawn
from the uniform distribution . However, on average, given the statistical properties of a
uniform distribution, its mean is easily derivable as .
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However, there is corruption opportunity due to the (upside) cost uncertainty.
If a public o¢ cial were to be corrupt, he/she procures gt=NSGt units of capital
goods (but with low-quality, [gt=NSGt ]), pays the actual realized cost incurred
( is again di¤erent for each corrupt o¢ cial, but on average, we can deduce
from the statistical mean of uniform distribution that the actual spending
is  per unit [(gt=NSGt )], but claims an inated amount that is optimal,
t 2 (; max), making a personal gain of (t  )(gt=NSGt ) on top of the wage
income14. These di¤erent variables (and their outcome) concerning the public
procurement process are summarised in Table 1.
Due to an imperfect monitoring e¤ort made by the government, it is as-
sumed, for simplicity, that a corrupt public o¢ cial faces a random probability,
p 2 (0; 1) of avoiding being caught, and probability, 1   p, of being caught.15
Public o¢ cials being caught are ned the full amount of his wage income,
therefore left with zero income. In this instance, the government is only able
to recover z fraction of the embezzled funds. For a corrupt public o¢ cial,
with an exogenous probability p, the o¢ cial succeeds in evading detection and
has an income of [(1   %)wSt   tct] + (optimal   )[gt=NSGt ]   hct, where hct
is the resources spent by a corrupt o¢ cial to attempt to conceal his/her be-
haviour. With a probability 1  p, the o¢ cial is apprehended and conscated
of all his income. In this case, the net payo¤ is then the training cost in-
14By implication, in the context of existing studies, this is similar to saying that those
public o¢ cials whose actual realised cost falls between  and max is corruptible, while those
facing cost below  is non-corruptible. As such, in strict mathematical terms, the share of
corrupt o¢ cials in the model refers to the share of corrupt o¢ cials out of the total public
o¢ cials susceptible to corruption.
15In line with the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model, this means the probability
of being detected is related one-to-one with the monitoring intensity (see van Schaik and
de Groot (2000) for an example). Thus, although given at the level of each individual
public o¢ cial, it is in principle treated as a choice variable by the government, which would
normally vary with unit monitoring costs. Later, for the purposes of sensitivity analysis,
this probability of getting caughthence the monitoring intensityis endogenised and allowed
to vary across time, depending on the total share of corrupt individuals in the economy,
"tN
SG
t =
N .
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curred to become skilled, tct, and the concealment cost, hct. As such, and
given the utility functional form in (1), a public o¢ cial will embezzle public
funds if his/her expected discounted utility is at least as good as not doing so,
pV SG;c;pt + (1  p)V SG;c;1 pt  V SG;nct . This gives:
p

((1  %)wSt   tct) + (t  
1 + max
2
)
gt
NSGt

+(1 p)[ tct] hct  (1 %)wSt  tct:
(28)
Similar to Haque and Kneller (2015), hct is assumed to be an increasing
function of the illegal income, (t   )(gt=NSGt ), given by
hct =

SLt
ULt

(t  
1 + max
2
)
gt
NSGt
; (29)
where  > 0. Unlike their specication, the concealment cost does not depend
on the share of corrupt o¢ cials ("t), which is endogenous in this model.16 In-
stead, it depends on the ratio of skilled over unskilled unemployment rate in the
economy, which is a novel feature of this model. The former is consistent with
the uemployment-as-disciplinary device specication of most Shapiro-Stiglitz
type of models, where the higher the skilled unemployment rate is, the more
costly for an o¢ cial to corrupt, hence the concealment cost. In contrast, the
higher the unskilled unemployment rate is in the economy, it is easier/cheaper
for the corrupt o¢ cials to conceal their behaviours, which is consistent with the
informal sector interpretation that sustained unemployment tends to translate
to an increase in hidden economic activities arena where embezzled funds
can be concealed.
Holding the incentive condition (28) in equality, and using gt =  Yt, (6),
(12), (29), we can derive a threshold value for the unit cost, t , above which
16The convenient specication of Haque and Kneller (2015) implies easier concealment
when corruption becomes more prevalent, which contradicts the model property of Lui
(1986). It also relies on the fact that the total number of public o¢ cials (NSGt ) is constant.
It is not suitable here due to the endogeneity of both NSGt and "t. "t is determined based
on the distribution of  here, and in an economy where NSGt is expanding, the concealment
cost may not be increasing with the NSGt .
19
a public o¢ cial will choose to be corrupt:
t = +
(1  p)
p
(1  %)t
 
NSGt
NSYt
"
1
p
 

SLt
ULt
# 1
; (30)
where t = [(kGt )
&m1 (1  )].
On aggregate, the law of large numbers means probability of individual
level equals the actual outcomes. At any time t, within the support (; max),
we know that the number of corrupt o¢ cials equals NSGt
R max
t
f()d. The
share of corrupt o¢ cials (as percentage of total public o¢ cials), "t, can there-
fore be computed as:
"t =
max   t
max    ; (31)
where t and  are as dened.
As such, the share of corrupt public o¢ cials, "t, in this model is determined
by the (inverse) distribution of the proteering opportunity to inate expen-
diture, within the support range of (; max). However, for the non-corrupt
group, 1  "t, the aggregate outcome is di¤erent from if there is no corruption.
Specically, the average claim made by non-corrupt public o¢ cials would equal
(1 + t )=2, instead of  (if there is totally no corruption), because there are
o¢ cials who are susceptible to corruption but opt not to corrupt. On aggre-
gate, the actual spending on (quality-adjusted) unit of public capital goods
procured is therefore
GKt = (1  "t)NSGt
gt
NSGt
+ "tN
SG
t 
gt
NSGt
= [1  "t(1 )]gt; (32)
while the total claimed/reported spending led by the public o¢ cials add up
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to17
GIt = (1  "t)NSGt
(1 + t )
2
gt
NSGt
+ "tN
SG
t
(t + 
max)
2
gt
NSGt
= f(1  "t)[(0:5)(1 + t )] + "t[(0:5)(t + max)]ggt: (33)
2.6 Public Finance
In terms of the scal budget, the government is assumed to maintain a balanced
budget in each period and cannot issue bonds to borrow. To nance its general
outlays, the government levies a tax on non-public sector workerswages at
the rate  , plus the salaries conscated from apprehended corrupt o¢ cials.
These outlays consist of the public emolument, GGt , the funds allocated for
public investment (public capital goods purchase in this context), GIt , another
funds allocated to provide minimum income in the form of social security
payment/unemployment benets to those unemployed in the economy, GSt ,
and spending on other items, GOt , assuming to be non-productive. It imposes
no fees for its services.
The governments general budget is given by
GGt +G
I
t +G
S
t +G
O
t (34)
= fwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1  %)wSt   tct]g
+(1  p)"t(1  %)wSt NSGt + (1  p)"tNSGt z(t  
1 + max
2
)
 Yt
NSGt
;
where the total outlays are nanced by the tax income and the recovered
funds from successful detection of corruption (the rst term is the the ned
wage, and the second term is the constant z fraction recovered from embezzled
17Note that the specication, (33), is only valid when there is an interior solution for the
system. In other words, there has to be leakage and therefore non-zero corruption rate in the
economy. Indeed, it can be shown that, the benchmark dynamic system characterizing the
model solutions derived eventually is only solvable for non-zero value of "t. In other words,
the special case of a corner solution of "t = 0 does not exist for the benchmark dynamic
system.
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funds)18, with public emolument given by
GGt = (1  %)wSt NSGt : (35)
Shares of spending are constant fractions of government revenues:
Git = i
*   wUt NUYt
+NSYt [(1  %)wSt   tct]

+(1  p)"t(1  %)NSGt
"
wSt
+z(t   1+
max
2
)  Yt
(1 %)NSGt
# +
; i = G; I; S;O
(36)
where i 2 (0; 1). Combining (34) and (36) therefore yields
I + G + S + O = 1: (37)
The tax-free nature of public o¢ cialswage income means skilled workers
will always prefer to work as government o¢ cials, though the total number
employed at any period t, NSGt , is largely determined by the share of govern-
ment revenues allocated to expenditure on emoluments. As seen in Appendix,
equating (35) and (36) for GGt , we can derive an expression for the share of
public o¢ cials in the economy, SGt = N
SG
t =
N , as:
SGt =
G
n
U
t
+

1  (1 )
[0:5(1+aCt )]

SYt
St
o
SYt(
[1  G(1  p)"t] + G [0:5(1+aCt )]
SYt
St
+(1  p)"tz(t   1+
max
2
)  
(1 %)
Yt
N
) ; (38)
where again, t = [(kGt )
&m1 (1   )], and ht , h = U; S; UY; SY; SG denote the
proportion of individuals of the respective category h in the adult population
N .
18In practice, for most kleptocracy or corruption cases, even when a public o¢ cial is found
guilty, the embezzled funds are usually not recovered in full. Further, the legal process
involved in tracing and recovering of the funds tend to be a lengthy process. The embezzled
funds therefore often end up being written o¤ from the government account. Given the
generally weak institutional capacity of a developing economy, we can expect z to be very
small, if not zero.
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In terms of public investment, the governments allocation, GIt is based on
the total claims made by public o¢ cials, not the actual spending incurred.
As such, even with assumed full depreciation, the evolution of public capital
stock, KGt+1 = G
K
t , but K
G
t+1 6= GIt , with the di¤erence being the public funds
embezzled by the corrupt o¢ cials. The evolution of public capital is therefore
characterised by
KGt+1 = G
K
t
= [1  "t(1 )]gt
= [1  "t(1 )] Yt: (39)
Let 't denotes a variable measuring the e¢ ciency of public investment [a
measure often modelled as exogenous, time-invariant parameter in standard
growth models with public investment (see Agénor, 2012)]. As shown in the
Appendix, we can compute 't by dividing (39) with (36), which yields
't =
GKt
GIt
=
[1  "t(1 )] 
fI [U + t(1  %)(1  [0:5(1+aCt )] (
SY
t (1  ) + SGt ))
+(1  p)"t(1  %)t 
SG
t
SYt
+ (1  p)"tz(t   1+
max
2
) ]g
Yt
KPt
:
(40)
In terms of the unemployment insurance/social security fund, the ows
accounting can be expressed as
bt[
UL
t + (1  %)SLt ] N = SffwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1  %)wSt   tct]g
+(1  p)"t(1  %)wSt NSGt
+(1  p)"tz(t  
1 + max
2
) Ytg;
which as shown in the Appendix, allows us to derive an expression for the
benet indexation variable, t:
t =
(
S[
U + t(1  %)(1  [0:5(1+aCt )] (
SY
t (1  ) + SGt ))
+(1  p)"t(1  %)t 
SG
t
SYt
+ (1  p)"tz(t   1+
max
2
) ]
)
ULt + (1  %)SLt
: (41)
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2.7 Labour Market Identities and Savings-Investment
Balance
To close the model, the equilibrium condition of the market for unskilled labour
(and the relevant shares in terms of ratios) is given by
NUt = N
UL
t +N
UY
t ; and 
U
t = 
UL
t + 
UY
t , (42)
where Ut = N
U
t = N , which from (8) equals to a
C
t . Thus, the probability of em-
ployment for an unskilled individual, UYt , and the probability of an unskilled
individual becoming unemployed, ULt , are given respectively by
UYt =
NUYt
NUt
=
UYt
Ut
; and ULt = 1  UYt =
NULt
NUt
=
ULt
Ut
: (43)
The equilibrium condition of the market for (e¤ective) skilled labour is
given by
NSt = N
SY
t +N
SG
t +N
SL
t ; and 
S
t = 
SY
t + 
SG
t + 
SL
t : (44)
The employment and unemployment probabilities for skilled workers are
given by
SYt =
NSYt
NSt
=
SYt
St
; SGt =
NSGt
NSt
=
SGt
St
; (45)
and SLt = 1  SYt   SGt =
NSLt
NSt
=
SLt
St
.
For the saving-investment balance, assuming full depreciation, the saving-
investment balance requires private capital in t + 1 to be equal to savings in
period t by all individuals born in t  1:19
KPt+1 = (s
U;Y
t N
UY
t + s
U;L
t N
UL
t ) + [s
SY
t N
SY
t + +s
S;L
t N
SL
t (46)
+sSG;Nct (1  "t)NSGt + sSG;c;pt "tNSG;c;pt ]:
19For convenience, we assume that the corrupt o¢ cials (that are not caught) are able to
invest the embezzled funds and earn standard market interest rate. Alternative, we could
have specied the model such that the embezzled funds can be invested in the black market
and earns a fraction of the market interest rate. This does not make a signicant di¤erence
to the results.
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3 Dynamic System and Balanced Growth Equi-
librium
In this economy, an imperfect equilibrium with corruption and unemployment is
a sequence of consumption and saving allocations fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h =
U; SY; SG, j = E;L, prices of production inputs fwUt ; wSt ; rt+1g1t=0, existing
blueprint varieties fMtg1t=0, private capital fKPt g1t=0, public capital fKGt g1t=0,
such that, given initial stocks M0; KP0 ; K
G
0 > 0,
a) all individuals, skilled or unskilled, employed or unemployed, publicly
or privately employed, maximise utility by choosing consumption subject to
their intertemporal budget constraint, taking factor prices, the tax rate, and
the unemployment benet as given;
b) the public o¢ cials maximise utility by choosing the cost to report (hence
to corrupt or not to corrupt), taking the overall distribution of the purchase
cost, , the probability of being detected, the quality of the nal goods, and
the public funds allocated for public investment as given;
c) rms in the nal good sector maximise prots by choosing labour, private
capital, and intermediate inputs, taking factor prices as given;
d) intermediate producers set prices so as to maximise prots, given the
perceived aggregate demand curve for their product;
e) design rms maximise prots by choosing skilled labour, taking wages,
patent prices, and public-private capital ratio as given;
f ) each equilibrium design fee extracts all prots made by the correspond-
ing intermediate producer; and
g) the trade union sets wages so as to maximise its utility, subject to the
demand for labour by rms in the nal good sector;
h) the nal good market clears;
i) unemployment of both categories of workers prevails; and
j ) non-zero share of corrupt o¢ cials prevails among the public o¢ cials.
A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium with corruption and un-
employment in which
a) fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY; SG, j = E;L, and KPt , KGt , Yt,
wUt , w
S
t , bt, grow at the constant, endogenous rate 1 + , implying that the
blueprint-private capital ratio and the public-private capital ratio is constant;
b) the rate of return on capital, 1 + rt+1, is constant;
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c) the threshold level of individuals who choose to remain unskilled, aCt , is
constant;
d) the threshold level of cost above which public o¢ cials opt to corrupt,
t , is constant;
e) the fractions of the skilled and unskilled labour force employed in man-
ufacturing, UYt and 
SY
t , and the fraction of o¢ cials employed in the public
sector, SGt , are constant;
f ) the proportion of the public o¢ cials who are corrupt, "t, is constant;
g) the benet indexation variable (as a ratio of income per capita), t, is
constant;
h) the price of intermediate goods Pt and the fee Qt, is constant;
i) skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, ULt and 
SL
t , are constant;
and
j ) employment and unemployment probabilities, UYt , 
SY
t , 
SG
t , and 
UL
t ,
SLt are constant.
In terms of properties of the equilibrium, as shown in the Appendix, the
dynamics of the model are mainly driven by the two di¤erence equations of
KGt =K
P
t andMt=K
P
t , as well as core static equations in terms of the nal good-
private capital ratio, Yt=KPt , the threshold level of ability (or equivalently the
share of unskilled workers), aCt , the shares of skilled workers in nal good
production and public sector, SYt and 
SG
t , the proportion of public o¢ cials
that are corrupt, "t, the threshold level of procurement cost, 

t , the share
of unskilled workers in nal good production, UYt , the shares of skilled and
unskilled workers in unemployment, SLt and 
UL
t , and the benet indexation
ratio, t . For the case in which  t =K
G
t =Yt is endogenous and varies over time,
the relevant  s in the derived equations are replaced by KGt =K
P
t / Yt=K
P
t , and
a relatively more complicated system is solved separately.
A key step in deriving the equilibrium growth rate is to establish the re-
strictions needed on the congestion parameters in (10). Let mt = Mt=KPt , this
involves setting U =  and + = + + ! = 1. Rearranging terms, we can
then yield an expression for Yt as a linear function of KPt :
Yt =
(kGt )
!=(1 )()=(1 )
[(UYt )
U ] 1=(1 )

mt
(1 )=	=(1 ) KPt : (47)
Lastly, the growth rate of nal output, 1+t, can be determined by noticing
that the growth rate of nal output equals the growth rate of physical capital.
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The expression is derived and shown in the Appendix. Given the complexity of
the system, both the solutions and the stability of the system cannot be studied
analytically. However, it is established numerically based on a parameterised
model by solving for an initial balanced growth equilibrium that satises the
properties dened earlier and verifying that following a shock, the system
converges to a new equilibrium.
4 Model Parameterisation
To examine the model properties and to study the general equilibrium e¤ects of
policy parameters, we parameterise the system based on a typical Sub-Saharan
African middle-income economies. Many middle-income African economies
that have successfully built up an industrial base, such as Kenya, South Africa,
and to a lesser extent, the non-oil sector of Nigeria20, are historically known
for having widespread corruption (Bakare, 2011) and structural unemployment
(Kester et al., 2016). Given the data limitation with regards to many of the
endogenous variables, we use a parameterisation technique, where the average
of the rst moment of the three economies are referred to, in parameterizing
the model. The parameterisations are based primarily on o¢ cial statistics
obtained from the various publications of the National Bureau of Statistics of
the three economies. Unless specied otherwise, all statistics are based on the
average during the 2011-15 period.
On the household sector, the annual discount rate is set at 0:04. With a 25
years structure (given that individuals live for two periods in the model), this
20While the economic structure of Nigeria depends primarily on its oil exports sector,
given that the model focuses mostly on growth (and not level) of real output, we lter
out the contribution of the oil sector when computing variables such as GDP growth rate
and nal output-to-physical capital ratio, whenever the statistics of Nigeria are referred to.
However, given that the main objective is not studying a specic economy but a stylized
representation of a middle-income economy with high corruption and unemployment but
large infrastructure gap, this is not a huge issue that will a¤ect the key take-aways from the
policy analysis conducted.
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gives an intergenerational discount rate of 0:375. The household savings rate,
, is estimated using the household survey data, which gives an estimation
of about 9:3 percent. For the time spent in tertiary education, based on a
standard 3:5 years spent in the university, % = 3:5=25 = 0:140 is obtained. In
terms of e¢ ciency of training, the parameter  is set at 0:7, which is in between
the 0:9 set by Agénor and Lim (2017) for high-income economy and the 0:5 set
by Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for the poorest low-income economy. In the
absence of training cost data, the parameterised value for the skills acquisition
cost (proportion to skilled wages), , is solved for using the equation for Ut ,
written below for convenience:
U = 1=

1  (1  %) 1 [
UY (1  ) + UL  (1  %)SL]
SY (1  ) + SG (
SY
[(kG)&
m
1 (1  )] )
 1=
:
To solve for , we still need the tax rate (), information from the inter-
mediate goods and design sector (&m1 , , ), the initial values for k
G, and the
relevant labour shares and probabilities. The tax rate on wages,  = 0:058,
is estimated by dividing the average total tax revenue as percentage of GDP
(obtained from World Bank World Development Indicators) by the average
labour share of the three economies. The latter is calculated based on the
compensation of employees reported in the national income statistics, which
yields an average of 0:28 for the three economies. This also provides the value
for the elasticity of nal good production to employed labour in the nal good
sector,  = 0:28. For the rest of the production parameters in the nal good
sector, the elasticity parameter with respect to private capital, , is set at
0:35, following Agénor and Lim (2017) and within the standard range for de-
veloping economies. Constant return-to-scale assumption for the production
function means  = 1      = 0:37. Lastly, for the elasticity of production
with respect to the public-private capital ratio, ! is set at 0:173, in line with
the meta-analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2014).
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In the intermediate goods and design sector, the substitution parameter,
, is set at 0:39, which is consistent with Lim (2018) and the non-competitive
scenario examined in Sequeira (2011). For the elasticity with respect to public
capital, &m1 , we use the lower-range estimate of Agénor and Neanidis (2015),
&m1 = 0:10, which is the same as the value used in Agénor and Alpaslan (2014).
Before moving on to the public sector and the unions, rst, we sort out the
initial steady-state values for the labour variables, especially those that are
required in the calculation of . Based on the average of the three economies,
the share of unskilled workers in the population, U , is set equal to 0:847,
which is calculated by subtracting the average share of workers with post-
secondary qualication. This gives S = 0:141. Using the approach, the
skilled, SL, and unskilled unemployment rate, UL, are calculated using the
raw unemployed numbers, which gives SL = 0:036 and UL = 0:106, with
the weighted average yielding a headline unemployment rate of 0:104. The
probability of a skilled worker getting unemployed, SLt = 0:255, and the
probability of an unskilled worker getting unemployed, UL = 0:125, are easily
derived. After that, the share of unskilled workers hired in the private sector,
UY , and the corresponding probability, UY , can be calculated, where UY =
U UL = 0:741, and UY = UY =U = 0:875. For the share of public o¢ cials,
given that only NBS Nigeria publishes detailed statistics, we use Nigeria data
for the parameterization. First, we know that the number of skilled civil
servants at grade GL12-GL17 of Nigerian public service as at end-2015 equals
141; 515. Dividing this by the total labour force as reported by the World
Bank, 59:1 million, gives SG = 0:0024, and the corresponding probability,
SG = 0:017. The share of skilled labour employed in the private sector, SY =
0:103, and the corresponding probability, SY = SY =S = 0:728, can then be
calculated. Lastly, the public-private capital ratio, kG, is set at 0:16, which
corresponds to the average estimate for the non-high income, Sub-Saharan
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African economies used in Agénor and Alpaslan (2014). Given all these initial
values, we can then calculate the skills acquisition cost, , which equals to
0:229.
In terms of the union bargaining parameters, U and S, we rely on the
estimate of Barnerjee et al. (2008) for South Africa, which documented a wage
mark-up of 1:23 times. Using (23), U = S = 0:158 are estimated. For the
wage elasticities with respect to unemployment level, {U and {S, we use the
average elasticity estimated by Kingdon and Knight (2006), again for South
Africa, and set both {U and {S to equal 0:108.
For the remaining variables and parameters in the public sector, using per-
sonnel cost data in the Public Finance Statistics published by the NBS Nigeria,
G = 0:337 is estimated. The share of spending on public infrastructure, I , is
obtained by dividing the average public infrastructure investment as a percent-
age of GDP with the total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
for the three economies, which gives I = 0:187. The share of total social
spending/benets as a percentage of government expenditure, S, cannot be
ascertained directly from the public nance statistics, and therefore needs to
be solved for using (41). This requires us to rst estimate the initial steady-
state value of . Due to a lack of data, we set the initial parameterization at
a low value of  = 0:02. To estimate for the initial share of corrupt o¢ cials, "
(which is always contentious to do so), we use a combination of the numbers
(proportion of civil servants declaring their assets) published in the Social Sta-
tistics Report 2016 and the percentage of rms making informal payments to
public o¢ cialsnumbers for Nigeria. The share of civil servants not declaring
their assets equals 0:425, while the latter is about 0:79. Assuming that this is
representative of the share of those non-declared o¢ cers who are corrupt, we
estimate " = 0:336. In terms of the probability of being detected, 1   p, we
set 1   p = 0:8, or equivalently, p = 0:2, in line with the average conviction
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rate of developing economies in the UN Crime Survey statistics. For the frac-
tion of embezzled fund recoverable upon successful detection of corruption,
we set z to a very small value of 0:05 to reect the weak institutional ca-
pacity typically characterising a lower-middle income economy. Given all the
parameterised initial values and parameters, S is estimated using (41), which
gives S = 0:125. Lastly, we still need to estimate 
max and then determine
the initial steady-state value of . Given all the calibrated parameters and
initial values, we rst calculate     using (30), which gives 0:098. Solv-
ing this simultaneously with (31), we obtain  = 1:246, max = 1:296, and
subsequently,  = 1:148.
The nal output-private capital ratio, Y=KP , is estimated using GDP and
private capital stock series obtained from the Penn World Table 9, which gives
an average of Y=KP = 0:524 for the three economies. This, couple with the
initial steady-state value of public-private capital ratio, kG = 0:16, allows for
the calculation of  , which equals 0:305. Following Agénor and Lim (2017),
the blueprint-private capital stock ratio, m, is normalised to 0:1, largely for
convenience and the fact that this initial ratio is immaterial to the results.
The public investment e¢ ciency ratio, 't, is set equal to 0:285, which is based
on the average index score (1.14 out of 4.0) estimated by Dabla-Norris et al.
(2012). Finally, the annual growth rates for nal output and private capital
in the initial steady state are set equal to 4:7 percent, which corresponds to
the average real GDP growth rate of the sample economies (with only the
non-oil sector of Nigeria being accounted for) during the period 2011-15. The
parameters and the initial steady-state values are summarised in Table 2 and
3 respectively.
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5 Policy Experiments
We start o¤ by considering two policy scenarios: (i) public sector downsiz-
ing (a cut in G), which is a measure that had been undertaken by various
Sub-Saharan governments before, such as the Obasanjo government in Nige-
ria in the late 1990s (Kester et al., 2016); and (ii) an attempt to raise the
minimum income by increasing the endogenous social security/benet rate,
t, which can be achieved by increasing the share of spending in social secu-
rity/benets in the budget, S. The latter, when simulated together with a
training cost cut, , allows for potentially achieving a simultaneous goal of job
creation/unemployment reduction: the policy goal of many African middle-
income economies, including the three referred to in our parameterization. In
addition, we also consider a scenario where there is a reduction in the unskilled
workersunion mark-up, which is usually a popular policy means in the labour
market reform literature to be used in increasing the absorption of unskilled
workers into the workforce.
After that, we simulate a conventional public infrastructure-push policy
scenario by increasing I . To preview, readers experienced in economic dy-
namics would notice from the Appendix that, in a corruption model with
leakages such as this (where the actual quality does not depend on on-paper
reported expenditure), the parameter I is policy-neutral and does not appear
anywhere in the di¤erence equation system, saved for the public investment
e¢ ciency index, 't. To overcome this characteristic of the benchmark solu-
tion, we examine a policy scenario with endogenous threshold and switching.
Specically, assuming a policy scenario where after a period of ambitious anti-
corruption reform reducing the corruption rate, "t, to below a certain threshold
level, the dynamics of the system would then change, in which equation (39)
is replaced by (36). This may be interpreted as the government successfully
reducing the corruption rate to a negligible level, hence closing the reporting
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gap between actual and reported expenditure on public capital.
As mentioned, for all the experiments, in addition to the benchmark case,
we also consider sensitivity analysis cases where there is (i) endogenous  t;
(ii) evolving probability p over time, by virtue of the one-to-one relationship
with monitoring intensity21; and (iii) a linear specication for the concealment
cost (elasticity parameter,  = 1:0 ), which also implies a stronger relationship
between the unemployment rates and the concealment cost. All the policy
shocks considered are permanent and their impact is measured in terms of a few
key variables the public investment e¢ ciency index, the corruption rate, the
unemployment rates, the size of the public sector employment, and the growth
rate of the nal output. Unless specied otherwise, all policy experimented
involves a 10 percent increase/decrease. All the simulation results (impact
and steady-state e¤ects) are summarised in Tables 4-7, with the transitional
dynamics associated with selected policy experiments presented in Figures 1-
4.22
5.1 Public Sector Downsizing
First, consider a 10 percent cut in the share of spending on public emoluments,
G, where the saved amount gets reallocated to other non-directly productive
expenditure component, O. Both the impact and steady-state e¤ects are pre-
21A common specication used in the development economics literature to model gradual
evolution involves assuming p to evolve according to pt = (pt 1)P (pm
N
"tNSGt
)1 P , where
P , set equal to 0:8 here, essentially means a high persistence for p. However, in consis-
tent with studies such as Haque and Kneller (2015), we assume that it gets easier for the
government to detect corruption the larger the share of corrupt o¢ cials becomes in the
population.
22Similar to Agénor and Alpaslan (2014), Agénor and Lim (2017), and other models
examining transitional dynamics in the literature, there is a distinction between generational
periods (T ) and simulated period (t). In principle, T corresponds to 25 years in a two-periods
lived structure, as reected in the discount factor and the assumption of full depreciation
of physical capital. However, all of the other parameters and variables either do not have
a time dimension or are calibrated on the basis of average annual data. For the numerical
experiments, the intended length of a unit of time interval is therefore t = 1=25, or best
understood as one year.
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sented in Table 4, with the transitional dynamics of key variables illustrated
in Figure 1. From (38), we see that a G cut has a direct downward shift
e¤ect on the e¤ective share of public o¢ cials, SGt , in the economy. Given
initial xed amount of e¤ective skilled labour, St , and those employed in the
private sector, SYt , this means there is a corresponding increase in skilled
unemployment, SLt , on impact. On the surface, by virtue of the specica-
tion of (29), the intended aim of such a policy intervention may be to provide
an uemployment-as-disciplinary, corruption-prevention incentive for the pub-
lic o¢ cials, at the cost of a slight increase in skilled unemployment. However,
in this model where public spending on emoluments have productive impli-
cations (despite the possibility of corruption) and there are richer feedback
mechanisms, the general equilibrium e¤ects of public sector workforce down-
sizing actually leads to more corruption in the economy. First, given that
the non-tax deductible skilled wage of a public o¢ cial represents the best job
possibility for a skilled worker, the fall in the probability of a skilled worker
getting employed as a public o¢ cial means a decline in the expected skilled
wages. This results in a disincentive for skills acquisition in the economy,
which is reected in the increase (decrease) in the share of unskilled (skilled)
workers. This larger unskilled workforce then has a proportionate impact on
the unskilled unemployment rate.
At the same time, in the public sector, less number of public o¢ cials means,
given xed units of public capital goods demanded in each period, gt, each re-
maining public o¢ cial is now in-charged of procuring more. This gives more
potential room for the inating of procurement cost, or mathematically, trans-
lates to a larger gap between the incentive for corruption threshold, t , and the
maximum-reportable max. Indeed, this direct e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of
the unemployment ratio has on the concealment cost. For any given number of
public o¢ cials that remains employed by the public sector, the share of those
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corrupt o¢ cials therefore rises. There is then a wider gap between the actual
and reported expenses, hence translating to a decline in public investment
e¢ ciency.
Over the long-run, for a given gt=NSGt unit of procurement responsibil-
ity, smaller NSGt translates to an overall smaller gt, which implies a smaller
public-to-private capital ratio in the economy. In the steady state, this is
slightly detrimental to growth a decline in nal output growth rate in the
order of  0:14 percentage points. In terms of the labour market, in the steady
state, the level e¤ect associated with the overall drop in the total pool of skilled
workers eventually overwrite the positive impact of skilled unemployment rate,
resulting in a steady-state net decline in SLt in the order of  0:03 percent-
age points. The overall impact on the headline unemployment rate is mildly
positive, due to a larger steady-state increase in the unskilled unemployment
rate. In terms of the public sector, in the steady state, the corruption rate, "t,
ends up 7 percentage points higher, despite a smaller share of public o¢ cials in
the economy. This, coupled with the  0:6 percentage points change in public
investment e¢ ciency and negative output growth rate, means a vanilla public
sector downsizing strategy can be detrimental to such an economy. Indeed, it
can be argued that the steady-state policy e¤ects of an increase in the headline
unemployment rate, a decrease in public investment e¢ ciency, an increase in
the economywide corruption rate, and a slightly negative growth e¤ects are
largely consistent with the economic performance observed during the infa-
mous public sector downsizing era of the Obasanjo government, as described
by Kester et al. (2016). Both Table 4 and Figure 1 also illustrate the policy
e¤ects under the other three sensitivity scenarios, which present largely similar
policy dynamics to the benchmark case (in the case with endogenous  t, the
generated solutions are much more unstable, though the overall transitional
paths remain consistent).
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In Table 4, we also consider an alternative scenario where the saved ex-
penses from a G cut is reallocated instead to social spending, S. Overall,
we see that the e¤ects are not much di¤erent from those observed in the pre-
vious scenario, only that the disincentive e¤ect on skills acquisition becomes
smaller (the cost associated with becoming unemployed after acquiring skills
[arisen from the retrenching public o¢ cials] is marginally smaller, given that
the level of unemployment benets received for the skilled unemployed is higher
in this scenario), with skills unemployment rate remains positive even in the
long-run. The steady-state corruption rate is also slightly lower, though the
negative growth e¤ect becomes relatively larger due to overall lower level of
production in the economy. This also suggests that the general equilibrium
e¤ects associated with a G cut is likely to dominate those associated with the
S rise, which is examined next.
5.2 Raising Minimum Income and Training
This policy experiment can be interpreted in the context of Nigerian President
Buharis recent Social Intervention Scheme (SIS), which has the intention of
creating more jobs, while simultaneously raising the minimum income of the
population. In the context of this model, we start by considering a plain 10
percent increase in the share of social security/benet spending, S, nanced
by a reallocation from other non-directly productive spending, O. The results
are illustrated in both Table 5 and Figure 2. Compared to the previous scenario
where such a scheme is nanced by a cut in emoluments, the overall policy
e¤ects are much improved.
In the context of the overall system, an increase in S, ceteris paribus, leads
to a larger indexation rate, t. This means the minimal income in the economy,
bt, for a given level of per capita income, increases. This results in the increase
in both the expected skilled wage and the expected unskilled wage, though the
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e¤ect on the former tends to be slightly larger (by virtue of the level, wSt >
wUt ). This therefore creates a net positive skills acquisition incentive (level
e¤ect), resulting in the overall expansion of skilled workforce in the economy.
Nevertheless, in terms of reallocation e¤ect, this policy predictably, does badly
in combatting unemployment, as both the skilled and unemployment rates go
up the former increases 0:3 percentage points in the steady state, while the
latter by 0:8 percentage points. The level of employment in the private sector
for both types of workers is lower, resulting in lower production and a negative
impact e¤ect on real output growth, in the order of  0:1 percentage points in
the steady state.
Nevertheless, instead of labelling such a policy as ine¤ective in typical clas-
sical economic interpretation, this policy does have its merits in an economy
with corruption. Overall, the net e¤ect or the change in unemployment ratio,
SLt =
UL
t , is positive (by virtue of the initial level of skilled unemployment be-
ing lower). From (29), this means the impact on concealment cost is higher, as
the uemployment-as-disciplinary, corruption-prevention incentive is in action
here. For any given cost associated with public procurement, the required
mark-up (inated cost) for any o¢ cial to corrupt becomes higher. Specically,
the incentive for corruption threshold, t , becomes larger, which in turns re-
sults in a smaller gap between t and 
max. In the steady state, the share of
corrupt o¢ cials therefore falls by 0:6 percentage points.
Indeed, the conventional argument for the use of minimum wage and un-
employment benet provision tend to focus on their potential e¤ects in in-
centivising the poor to accumulate human capital. In other words, if such
a policy is associated with a simultaneous reduction in the skills acquisition
cost in the economy, then the economic implications are good. A crude ex-
periment to examine this involves simulating an increase in S and  each
by 10 percent, nanced by a 20 percent cut in O, as also shown in Table
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5. The skills expansion e¤ect is predictably larger, which is associated with a
smaller deviation in unskilled unemployment rate (by implications, the overall
headline unemployment rate), though still positive, and more importantly, a
positive steady-state e¤ect on real output growth rate. While this scenario
does result in a by-product of a slightly larger skilled unemployment rate, this
is warranted as, along with higher expected skills wage premium, it provides a
stronger corruption-prevention incentive, which in steady state, translates to a
 9 percentage point change in the share of corrupt o¢ cials. In others words,
the share of corrupt o¢ cials declines from the initial 33:6 percent of total
public o¢ cials to 24:6 percent. This decline in corruption, together with the
positive growth e¤ect associated with skills expansion, leads to an improved
public investment e¢ ciency ratio by 0:4 percentage points.
5.3 Ambitious Social Reform Programme
As seen in the previous experiments, there is some merits in using a mini-
mum income/wage strategy in addressing corruption in a developing economy.
However, any ambitious social reform programme must necessarily also aim to
reduce the headline total unemployment rate. In the model context, a policy
that can achieve a reduction in unskilled unemployment rate is through union
reform one of the labour market reform policies found by Bernal-Verdugo
et al. (2012) to be e¤ective in reducing unemployment for their non-OECD
country sample. More specically, consider a 10 percent reduction in the pa-
rameter U , which governs the mark-up over the target wage for the unskilled
workers, as seen in (23). In a non-technical context, within such a model
where there is no explicit distinction between participation rate, this may be
interpreted as a policy designed to bring more unskilled workers into the em-
ployed labour force. The results of this individual policy are summarised in
Table 6, with the transitional dynamics presented in Figure 3. In all four
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cases analysed, the steady-state e¤ect on unskilled unemployment rate is con-
sistently negative. While the e¤ects on growth and skilled unemployment rate
are marginally lower and higher respectively, this individual policy provides
another useful tool in tackling corruption while simultaneously reducing the
headline unemployment rate.
Next, we consider an ambitious composite reform programme. Specically,
we consider an increase in S by 10 percent, a training cost cut, , by 20
percent, and a reduction in U by 20 percent (which translates to 1:17 times
of mark-up), with both the impact and steady-state results also presented in
Table 6. In the steady-state, we see that there is a robust increase in the
e¤ective share of skilled labour by 1:3 percentage points, a decline in head-
line unemployment rate in the order of  0:4 percentage points, and a positive
growth e¤ect of 0:27 percentage points. However, the absolute deviation of
public investment e¢ ciency index remains negative, and the skilled unemploy-
ment rate increases by 1:2 percentage points. With the policy tool of public
infrastructure investment share, I , being irrelevant in this dynamic system,
there is no room for the use of a conventional infrastructure-push policy to
address these two shortcomings. Nonetheless, in the benchmark case, the pro-
gramme is very e¤ective in reducing the public sector corruption rate, with the
benchmark case registering a steady-state deviation of the order  25:9 per-
centage points, or equivalently, reducing corruption rate to only 7:6 percent of
the total public o¢ cials in the economy. Indeed, at some point along the tran-
sition, corruption rate is reduced to an insignicant level, which paves the way
for a subsequent examination of an endogenous threshold-induced structural
change.
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5.4 Public Investment in Infrastructure
As documented in Agénor (2012) and Agénor and Lim (2017), public invest-
ment in infrastructure, through its productivity-enhancing supply-side e¤ects,
can be a powerful tool in raising nal output growth while addressing the
persistent absorption/skilled unemployment issue associated with a skills ex-
pansion policy. However, in a corruption-based model such as this where
there is a di¤erence between actual and reported public investment expenses,
a measure such as I can become impotent (as seen in Table 7). Neverthe-
less, a conceptually plausible composite reform strategy is to rst push the
corruption rate in the economy down to an insignicant level, after which the
government will be able to wipe out corruption and close the quality-reporting
gap associated with public investment. After that, I can become a viable pol-
icy tool. Specically, we introduce a regime-switching approach based on an
endogenous threshold of (insignicant) corruption level, "^ = 0:03, below which
then a regime-switch is triggered and the dynamics are then driven by a dif-
ferent system.23 Specically, the new system is derived and can be referred to
in the Appendix [equations (A40a) to (A40m)], which is clearly independent
of "t and . In terms of the public capital, given that there is no more leakage
in the new regime, (33) is no longer applicable, and the budgetary version of
(36) ought to be used in place of GIt .
For all four cases studied (benchmark, plus the other three sensitivity
analysis cases), we introduce this endogenous switching condition and exam-
ine again, the ambitious composite reform programme, plus an increase in I
also by 10 percent. The experiment results are summarised in Table 7, with
transitional dynamics presented in Figure 4. Of the four cases studied, only
23An arbitrarily low corruption rate of "^ = 0:03 is set as what we deemed as insignicant
rate of corruption that will trigger a regime-switch and therefore structural change in the
economy. This is due to the technicality that the corner solutionwith "t = 0 does not
exist for the benchmark system, which is only solvable when interior solutions exist.
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the benchmark model triggers the regime-switch when corruption rate drops
below its threshold, "^ = 0:03, in period t = 4. As such, there is a structural
change induced. For the dynamics illustrated in Figure 4, save for the line
labelled Benchmark (with switching)and the graph for public investment ef-
ciency, the other four represent exactly the same transitional dynamics that
we would have observed for the composite programme examined earlier (given
the irrelevance of I prior to switching).
Comparing the benchmark case with and without regime-switching taking
place, we see that the subsequent introduction of I results in nal output
growth rate to be at +0:4 percentage points at end-steady state. This is due
to the huge gain in public investment e¢ ciency as a result of the structural
change. The increase in skilled unemployment rate has also become much
more manageable. Nonetheless, the policy e¤ects on reducing unskilled and
headline unemployment rate has become not as e¤ective in such a hypothetical
corruption-free economy. These results provide interesting food-for-thought on
whether social policies designed to reduce unemployment rate would work as
well in a zero-corruption economy, especially given the existence of the dy-
namic tradeo¤ between skilled unemployment and corruption. Nevertheless,
the results from the regime-switching exercise suggests a role for the seemingly
(and usually classied as) unproductive social spending in promoting struc-
tural change in a corruption-heavy developing economy, before the implemen-
tation of a standard large-scalepublic infrastructure push an observation
not previously documented in the literature.
6 Concluding Remarks
This article presents a dynamic endogenous growth model with heterogeneous
labour, endogenous unemployment and public sector corruption to address four
shortcomings in the existing literature on macroeconomics of corruption. Un-
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like previous studies, the model does not separate public o¢ cials and private
individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appoint-
ment as a public servant is modelled as an occupational choice, which then
allows for the endogenous determination of all three variables of the proportion
of public o¢ cials, the share of corrupt o¢ cials among them, and the public
investment e¢ ciency within a dynamic system. Parameterised for a stylized
representation of a typical middle-income African economies with the twin-
highproblem of corruption and unemployment, the dynamics of endogenous
corruption and unemployment, as well as their policy tradeo¤, are studied
using simulated policy experiments, ranging from public sector downsizing,
social intervention scheme, to an ambitious social reform programme preced-
ing a push in public infrastructure investment. The novel contributions of the
study are summarised in the introduction and need not be repeated here. We
therefore focus on potential extensions that can be pursued in future research.
The dynamic relationship between unemployment and corruption in this
model depends critically on the specication of the concealment cost function.
While sensitivity analysis results seem to suggest that functional specication
does not signicantly a¤ect the results, the validity of the Shapiro-Stiglitz
type of uemployment-as-disciplinary mechanism does play a signicant role
in shaping the unemployment-corruption nexus in this model. While there
are empirical studies documenting this relationship, such as Bouzid (2016),
the empirical validity remains limited. As such, for future studies, a rigorous
empirical examination based on a more parsimonious version of this model is
warranted. In terms of theoretical extension, the model can be extended to
account for other forms of public sector corruption, notably those associated
with tax collection. That will then enable more detailed examinations of the
tax implications, which is a feature largely simplied in this model. In addi-
tion, many African economies have a sizeable oil or natural resource sector,
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including Nigeria, of which this study has largely abbreviated. This is done
as a self-contained measure, as adding a largely exogenous oil sector will have
no e¤ect on any policy direction observed with the policy experiments imple-
mented. For future study, a more sophisticated model with greater emphasis
on the natural resources sector is denitely worth-exploring.
43
References
Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier (1998) Property Rights, Corruption and the Allo-
cation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach, Economic Journal, 108:
1381403.
Agénor, PR (2012) Public Capital, Growth and Welfare, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Agénor, PR (2016) Aid Volatility, Human Capital, and Growth, Working Pa-
per No. 219, Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research, University of
Manchester.
Agénor, PR and B. Alpaslan (2014) Infrastructure and Industrial Development
with Endogenous Skill Acquisition, Working Paper No. 195, Centre for Growth
and Business Cycle Research, University of Manchester.
Agénor, PR and O. Canuto (2015) Middle-Income Growth Traps, Research in
Economics, 69: 641-60.
Agénor, PR and O. Canuto (2017) Access to Finance, Product Innovation and
Middle-income Traps, Research in Economics, 71: 337-55.
Agénor, PR and K.Y. Lim (2017) Unemployment, Growth and Welfare E¤ects
of Labour Market Reforms, Working Paper No. 232, Centre for Growth and
Business Cycle Research, University of Manchester.
Agénor, PR, M. Nabli, T. Yousef and H.T. Jensen (2007) Labor Market Reforms,
Growth, and Unemployment in Labor-Exporting Countries in the Middle East
and North Africa, Journal of Policy Modeling, 29: 277-309.
Agénor, PR, and K. Neanidis (2015) Innovation, Public Capital, and Growth,
Journal of Macroeconomics, 44: 252-75.
Anand, R. and P. Khera (2016) Macroeconomic Impact of Product and Labor
Market Reforms on Informality and Unemployment in India, IMF Working
Paper No. 16/47, International Monetary Fund.
Bakare, A. S. (2011) The Crowding-Out E¤ects of Corruption in Nigeria: An
Empirical Study, Journal of Business Management and Economics, 2: 59-68.
Banerjee, A. (1997) A Theory of Misgovernance, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 112: 1289-332.
Banerjee, A., S. Galiani, J. Levinsohn, Z. McLaren and I. Woolard (2008) Why
has Unemployment Risen in the New South Africa?, Economics of Transition,
16: 715-40.
Bernal-Verdugo, L., D. Furceri and D. M. Guillaume (2012) Labor Market Flex-
ibility and Unemployment: New Empirical Evidence of Static and Dynamic
E¤ects, Comparative Economic Studies, 54: 251-73.
44
Bhattacharyya, C., and M. R. Gupta (2015) Unionised Labour Market, Unem-
ployment Allowances, Productive Public Expenditure and Endogenous Eco-
nomic Growth, Metroeconomica, 66: 397-425.
Blackburn, K. and G. F. Forgues-Puccio (2009) Why is Corruption Less Harmful
in Some Countries than in Others, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation, 72: 797-810.
Blackburn, K. (2010) Endogenous Corruption in Economic Development, Jour-
nal of Economic Studies, 37: 4-25.
Blackburn, K., N. Bose and M. E. Haque (2011) Public Expenditure, Bureau-
cratic Corruption and Economic Development,Manchester School, 79: 405-28.
Bom, P. R. and J. E. Ligthart (2014) What HaveWe Learned fromThree Decades
of Research on the Productivity of Public Capital?, Journal of Economic
Surveys, 28: 889-916.
Bose, N., S. Capasso and A. P. Murshid (2008) Threshold E¤ects of Corruption:
Theory and Evidence, World Development, 36: 1173-91.
Bouzid, B. N. (2016) Dynamic Relationship between Corruption and Youth Un-
employment, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7842, Washington DC:
World Bank.
Chakraborty, S. and E. Dabla-Norris (2011) The Quality of Public Investment,
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 11: 1-29.
Cule, M. and M. Fulton (2005) Some Implications of the Uno¢ cial Economy
Bureaucratic Corruption Relationship in Transition Countries, Economic Let-
ters, 89: 207-11.
Dabla-Norris, E., J. Brumby, A. Kyobe, Z. Mills and C. Papageorgiou (2012)
Investing in Public Investment: An Index of Public Investment E¢ ciency,
Journal of Economic Growth, 17: 235-66.
Delavallade, C. (2006) Corruption and Distribution of Public Spending in De-
veloping Countries, Journal of Economics and Finance, 30: 222-39.
Del Monte, A. and E. Papagni (2001) Public Expenditure, Corruption, and Eco-
nomic Growth: The case of Italy, European Journal of Political Economy, 17:
1-16.
Dzhumashev, R. (2014) The Two-way Relationship between Government Spend-
ing and Corruption and its E¤ects on Economic Growth, Contemporary Eco-
nomic Policy, 32: 403-19.
Dzhumashev, R. (2016) The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption
Growth Nexus, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 16: 1169-201.
Dinopoulos, E. and P. S. Segerstrom (1999) A Schumpeterian Model of Protec-
tion and Relative Wages, American Economic Review, 89: 450-72.
Ehrlich, I. and F. T. Lui (1999) Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Eco-
nomic Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 107: 27093.
45
Fredriksson, A. (2010) Bureaucracy Intermediaries, Corruption and Red Tape,
Journal of Development Economics, 108: 107-14.
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2000) Ability biased technological transition, wage in-
equality and growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 469-98.
Guriev, S. (2004) Red Tape and Corruption, Journal of Development Economics,
73: 489-504.
Haque, M. E., and R. Kneller (2015) Why Does Public Investment Fail to Raise
Economic Growth? The Role of Corruption, Manchester School, 83: 623-51.
Heer, B., and A. Morgenstern (2005) The Labor Market E¤ects of Indexing
Unemployment Benets to Previous Earnings, Public Finance Review, 33:
385-402.
Infante, D. and J. Smirnova (2009) Rent-Seeking Under A Weak Institutional
Environment, Economic Letters, 104: 118-21.
Jones, C. I. (2005) Growth and Ideas, in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. by
P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Elsevier, 1B, 1063-111.
Lackó, M. (2004) Tax Rates and Corruption: Labour-market and Fiscal E¤ects,
Research Reports No. 309, Vienna Institute for International Economic Stud-
ies.
Lim, K.Y. (2018) Industrial Transformation with Heterogeneous Labor and For-
eign Experts, Macroeconomic Dynamics, First View.
Kester, K.O, A. R. Bankole, and O.S. Samuel (2016) The Trade Union Movement
and the Challenges of Economic Reforms in the Emerging Nigerian Economy,
in Reforms and Nigerian Labour and Employment Relations: Perspectives,
Issues and Challenges, ed. by D. Otobo, Chapter 12, Malthouse Press.
Kingdon, G. and J. Knight (2006) How Flexible Are Wages in Response to Local
Unemployment in South Africa?, ILR Review, 59: 471-95.
Lui, F. T. (1986) A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence, Journal of Public
Economics, 31: 215-36.
Mauro, P. (1997) The E¤ects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Govern-
ment Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, in Corruption and the Global
Economy, ed. by K. A. Elliott, Institute for International Economics.
Méndez, F. and F. Sepúlveda (2006) Corruption, Growth and Political Regimes:
Cross Country Evidence, European Journal of Political Economy, 22: 82-98.
Ndikumana, L (2006) Corruption and Pro-Poor Growth Outcomes: Evidence
and Lessons for African Countries, Working Paper No. 120, Political Economy
Research Institute.
Rajkumar, A. S., and V. Swaroop (2008) Public spending and outcomes: Does
governance matter?Journal of Development Economics, 86: 96-111.
Ryvkin, D. and D. Serra (2012) How Corruptible Are You? Bribery Under
Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81: 466-77.
46
Sarte, PD (2000) Informality and Rent-Seeking Bureaucracies in a Model of
Long-run Growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 46: 173-97.
Sequeira, T. (2011) R&D Spillovers In An Endogenous Growth Model With
Physical Capital, Human Capital, And Varieties, Macroeconomic Dynamics,
15: 223-39.
Spinesi, L. (2009) Rent-Seeking Bureaucracies, Inequality, and Growth, Journal
of Development Economics, 90: 244-57.
Tanaka, H., and T. Iwaisako (2009) Product cycles, endogenous skill acquisition,
and wage inequality, Canadian Journal of Economics, 42: 300-31.
Van Schaik, A., and H. de Groot (2000) Unemployment, Growth and E¢ ciency
Wages, in Growth, Unemployment and Deindustrialization, ed. by H. de
Groot, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
World Bank (2012) World Development Report 2013 : Jobs. Washington DC:
World Bank.
47
Table 1
Variables and their Di¤erent Outcome in the Models
Public Capital Good Procurement Framework
Variable High-quality Low-quality
Unit of quality purchased 1  < 1
Raw unit of quantity purchased gt
NSGt
gt
NSGt
Unit of quality-adjusted purchase gt
NSGt
[ gt
NSGt
]
Actual cost/spending incurred Drawn from 1
t 2 (1; max)
Claimed/reported cost/spending Drawn from 1
by a non-corrupt o¢ cial t 2 (1; max)
Claimed/reported cost/spending Drawn from Drawn from
by a corrupt o¢ cial t 2 (; max) t 2 (; max)
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Table 2
Parameter Values: Benchmark Case
Parameter Description Value
Households
 Intergenerational discount rate 0:375
 Household savings rate 0:093
 Training productivity parameter 0:7
 Skills acquisition cost 0:229
% Time allocated to university 0:140
Private sector production
! FG elasticity wrt public-private capital ratio 0:173
 FG elasticity wrt unskilled workers 0:28
 FG elasticity wrt private capital 0:35
 FG elasticity wrt intermediate input 0:37
 Substitution parameter, intermediate goods 0:39
&m1 Blueprint elasticity wrt public services 0:100
Public sector
 Tax rate on total wages 0:058
I Share of spending on infrastructure 0:187
G Share of spending on public emoluments 0:337
S Share of spending on social security/benets 0:125
 Sub-quality public capital good purchase 0:7
 Elasticity parameter, concealment cost 0:5
p Probability of avoiding detection 0:8
max Upper bound, cost for inated reporting 1:296
 Ratio of capital goods demanded by government 0:305
z Fraction of embezzled funds recovered 0:05
Labour union
U Relative weight, unskilled workers 0:158
S Relative weight, skilled workers 0:158
{U Elasticity wrt unemployment, unskilled wage 0:108
{S Elasticity wrt unemployment, skilled wage 0:108
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Table 3
Initial Steady-State Values of Key Variables
Variable Description Value
U Share of unskilled workers in population 0.847
S Share of e¤ective skilled workers in population 0.141
SG Share of (e¤ective skilled) public o¢ cials 0.002
SY Share of e¤ective skilled workers in private sector 0.103
SL Skilled unemployment rate 0.036
UY Share of unskilled workers in private sector 0.741
UL Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106
SG Prob. of skilled workers employed in public sector 0.017
SY Prob. of skilled workers employed in private sector 0.728
SL Prob. of skilled workers getting unemployed 0.255
UY Prob. of unskilled workers getting employed 0.875
UL Prob. of unskilled workers getting unemployed 0.125
" Corruption rate 0.336
 Social security/benet rate, to per capita income 0.020
kG Public-private capital ratio 0.160
Y=KP Final output-private capital ratio 0.524
m Blueprint-private capital stock ratio 0.100
 Optimal threshold cost for inated reporting 1.246
't Public investment e¢ ciency 0.285
50
Public Sector Downsizing:a Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.002
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.062 0.069 0.062 0.045 0.055 0.048 0.045 0.050
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.002
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.007 ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐0.018 ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐0.004 ‐0.004
Public Sector Downsizing, with Reallocation to
Social Security/Benefit Spending:b  Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.008
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.059 0.064 0.060 0.042 0.053 0.049 0.044 0.047
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.002
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.007 ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐0.014 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 ‐0.003
a/ A reduction in νG by 10 percent.
b/ A reduction in νG  by 10 percent, leading to an increase in νS by 10 percent.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4  
Policy Experiment Results for (i) Public Sector Downsizing, and (ii) Public Sector Downsizing, but with reallocation to Social Security Spending
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Baseline
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending:c Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.002
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.003 ‐0.006 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.002 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.004
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.001
Public investment efficiency 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 0.000
Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, 
plus a Cut in Training Cost:d Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.003 ‐0.008 ‐0.003 ‐0.008 ‐0.003 ‐0.007 ‐0.003 ‐0.008
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.007
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.057 ‐0.090 ‐0.055 ‐0.047 ‐0.038 ‐0.022 ‐0.031 ‐0.042
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.003 0.001 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 0.001
Public investment efficiency 0.285 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.015 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 0.000
c/ An increase in νS by 10 percent, financed by a 10 percent cut in νO.
d/ An increase in νS and μ each by 10 percent, financed by a 20 percent cut in νO.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Table 5   
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Policy Experiment Results for (i) Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, and (ii) Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, plus a reduction in training cost, both 
financed by a reallocation from other non‐directly productive public spending 
Reduction in Unskiled Workers' Union Mark‐up:e Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.002 ‐0.028 ‐0.003 ‐0.017 ‐0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.001 ‐0.013
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001
Public investment efficiency 0.285 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Ambitious Social Reform:
Social Intervention & Job Creation:f Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.006 ‐0.015 ‐0.006 ‐0.013 ‐0.006 ‐0.012 ‐0.006 ‐0.014
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.012
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.004 ‐0.006 ‐0.004 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.003
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.127 ‐0.259 ‐0.124 ‐0.137 ‐0.081 ‐0.055 ‐0.068 ‐0.128
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.003 0.003 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 0.001
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.021 ‐0.009 ‐0.020 0.020 ‐0.026 ‐0.029 ‐0.027 ‐0.022
e/ A reduce of ξU by 10 percent, which translates to wage mark‐up going from 1.23 times to 1.20 times.
f/ An increase in νS by 10 percent, a training cost cut, µ, by 20 percent, and a reduction in ξ
U by 20 percent, which translates to 1.17 times of mark‐up.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 6   
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Policy Experiment Results for (i) a Reduction in Unskilled Workers' Union Mark‐up, and (ii) Ambitious Social Reform Programme
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
An Increase in the Share of Public Investment:g Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.026 ‐0.026 ‐0.026 ‐0.026 ‐0.026 ‐0.026 ‐0.042 ‐0.043
Ambitious Social Reform, coupled with An Increase 
in the Share of Public Investment:h
Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.006 ‐0.015 ‐0.006 ‐0.001 ‐0.006 ‐0.013 ‐0.006 ‐0.012 ‐0.006 ‐0.014
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.012
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.004 ‐0.006 ‐0.004 0.001 ‐0.004 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.003
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.127 ‐0.260 ‐0.127 ‐0.336 ‐0.124 ‐0.138 ‐0.081 ‐0.056 ‐0.068 ‐0.128
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.003 0.003 ‐0.003 0.004 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.003 0.001
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.021 ‐0.008 ‐0.021 0.716 ‐0.020 0.020 ‐0.026 ‐0.029 ‐0.027 ‐0.020
g/ An increase in νI by 10 percent, financed by a 10 percent cut in νO.
h/ An increase in νS band vI by 10 percents, a training cost cut, µ, by 20 percent, and a reduction in ξ
U by 20 percent, which translates to 1.17 times of mark‐up.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 7
Policy Experiment Results for (i) An Increase in the Share of Public Investment, and (ii) Ambitious Social Reform, plus an Increase in Share of Public Investment, 
with Models with Endogenous Threshold for Corruption
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
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Public Sector Downsizing 
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Figure 2
An Increase in the  Share of Social Security / Benefit Spending 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 3
Reduction in Unskiled Workers' Union Wage Mark-up 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 4
Ambitious Social Reform, coupled with an Increase in Share of Public Investment 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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